Dispute rose between the parties regarding an agreement by the parties for the sale of land & the construction thereon of a house by the appellants. The arbitrator upheld the agreement of sale and construction. The award was subsequently registered with, & became an order of, the High Court. The appellant filed an application in the court a quo entitled “Application for Review & Leave to Apply Out of Time”. In the application, the appellant sought to have the arbitral award set aside on the basis that it was “grossly unreasonable”. The court a quo dismissed the application on three grounds: application should have been made in terms of Article 34 of the Model Law; second application filed more than three months after receipt of arbitral award; third no good explanation for delay.
Applicant (Mushaka) and the first responding (Zhanje) ran a real estate business in partnership until a dispute arose between then. The applicant then instituted proceedings in this court; in order to expedite the resolution of the matter, the dispute was referred to the second respondent (Anor, the arbitrator) for determination. But the award was contested by the applicant.
Dismissed with costs. I am unable to accept the applicant’s contention that the arbitrator award went beyond his remit under the broad submission to arbitration. Given that the partnership was not intended to continue but was to be dissolved, the appointment of assets at that stage cannot logically be contrary to the law of partnership. The public policy argument under article 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Model Law is to be restrictively construed so as to preserve and recognize the basic objective of finality in the arbitration process. In my view, the challenged award does not constitute a palpable inequity that is so far reaching and outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that a sensible and fair minded person would consider that the conception of justice in Zimbabwe would be intolerably hurt by the award. Accordingly, the applicant has not succeeded in justifying either of the grounds of challenge.
A review application in connection with an award made by the third respondent (Chigwendere) as an arbitrator in the dispute between the applicant (NSSA) and the second respondent (Workers committee). The Works Council couldn’t agree on the general salary increase and the amount of the transport allowance. So the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded increment on the wages and salary. NSSA has applied for a review of the award.
Application dismissed. There is no indication in the award that the arbitrator did not apply his mind to the question or that he totally misunderstood the issue. The main objection by one of the parties to the arbitral award is that the arbitrator failed to give reasons for the award, which that party should have applied, as a matter of urgency, for the arbitrator to furnish his reasons within a specified period. If the arbitrator failed to furnish his reasons or furnished reasons which indicated that there were grounds for setting aside the award in terms of Article 34, then the requisite application could be filed.
Applicant (Pamire) filed a court application in which they sought to have a certain arbitration award made by first respondent in favor of the second respondent, set aside on the grounds of gross unreasonableness. The second respondent filed an application seeking an order to have the same arbitration award enforced.
The judge has allowed the affidavit to be admitted because the applicants opposed the application under case NO.HC 1437/98 on the grounds that to recognize and enforce the award would be contrary to public policy. In addition, the judge wasn’t persuaded that an arbitration award made under the provisions of the Arbitration Act can be set attacked other than in terms of S34 of the Model Law contained in the Schedule to the Arbitration Act. The limited grounds of attack are meant to ensure international uniformity in the application of the law, which is of international origin and which is intended to govern both domestic and international arbitration. It is, further, not their case that they were not afforded a chance to fully present their case to the first respondent and to meet all of the second respondent’s contentions against them. So, to that extend no breach of the rules of natural justice during the arbitration process and also no grossly unreasonable decision is necessarily the result of a breach of the rules of natural justice. The first responding erred in awarding the sum of $15312000 as damages and did not take into account the fact that the second respondent still had to pay the outstanding sum of $217729.54. The second respondent after receiving the sum of $15312000, at the end of the agreed period, it would have had to invest the sum of $1500000. In the absence of such an investment, the full reward would not have been forth coming. To therefore grant the full reward in the absence of complete performance by the second respondent does make justice turn on his head. So the applicant’s application is dismissed with costs and also the second respondent’s. The award of the arbitrator is set aside.
Respondent (Maposa) sought an order form the High Court to enforce an arbitral award. The appellant (ZESA) countered with a claim to have the award declared null and void & set aside. The judge dismissed both case. So ZESA noted an appeal& Maposa cross appealed.
ZESA’s counter claim of the High Court (to have the award declared null & void and set aside) is allowed with costs. Order of High Court is set aside. Cross-appeal is dismissed with costs.
The applicant (FSI) entered into an agreement of sale with first respondent (RTZ); however FSI claims that RTZ had breached certain of the express warranties, so they decided to take the case to an arbitrator. Then FSI sought to have arbitration proceedings set aside on the basis that the arbitrator had misconducted the proceedings because the arbitrator wanted to hear evidences/arguments of both parties separately. No objection rose. When one party asked to listen to the other’s representative argument, the arbitrator was willing to arrange a meeting but then the party’s representative decided it was unnecessary. The submissions & argument raised by each party were made known to the other party, which was given an opportunity to respond.
The applicant (Durco) engaged the service of a broking company Croplink, to dispose of its maize on the Zimbabwe Commodity Exchange (Zimace). The respondent (Dajen) was at the same time desirous of procuring substantial quantities of maize for its milling activities; it engaged the services of Atrax to act on its behalf. A contract was concluded by Croplink & Atrax in terms of which Durco sold to Dajen. The latter refused to take delivery of the maize. As a consequence dispute arose between Durco & Dajen & was referred to arbitration. Dajen was found not liable.
Application succeeded. The arbitral award in favor of the applicant is recognized for that to be provided without jeopardizing the October hearing dates which were fixed by agreement of the parties. Applying the ordinary case management principle, I conclude that the claimant should not be permitted to rely on the new evidence which it seeks to adduce. The hearing of this section 67 challenge will therefore be limited to the material which was before the arbitrators.
The case deals with whether the award is to be understood in its literal sense or in the sense which any judgment or order of court must be understood. There is an ambiguity in an award, so the court is entitled to interpret the award or any of its constitutive words/phrases, for the purpose of clarifying what he ordered to be done. No allegations that the arbitrator made a mistake. Parties differ only in their interpretation of it. The non-applicability of the duplum rule in the present case would result in the violation of a fundamental principle of the law. It’s on this basis that the respondent’s opposition to the application would be justified. The public policy defense applies.
Arbitral award, in favor of the applicant is recognized & enforced. The respondent shall pay to the applicant the sum of $1 539 402.84 and costs of suit on the High Court scale, the respondent’s counterclaim has been dismissed with costs.
The case is about a disagreement on the amount of money to be paid to the workers (respondents) by the appellant (city of Harare); workers demanded for 330 percent salary increase but they were awarded 120 percent. So the city of Harare appealed to set aside the arbitral award which was in favor of the respondent.
The appeal has been dismissed, the court believed that if the appellant has the capacity to pay astronomical salaries to its top heavily officers but that same entity is reluctant to pay its lowly paid workers a living wage, and then the arbitrator has made the right decision.
The main issue is to find that an arbitrator’s decision is contrary to public policy. The appellant (Beazley) was the liquidator of a construction company which had contracted to build a dam for the second respondent, who had cancelled the contract. The first respondent was an arbitrator and decided in favor of the second appellant by validating the cancellation. The High Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision. An appeal has been made by the liquidator.
Appeal has been dismissed. The award made by the arbitrator constitutes a palpable inequity that is far reaching and outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that a sensible and fair minded person would consider that the conception of justice in Zimbabwe would be intolerably hurt by the award.