This is an appeal against the dismissal of the appellant’s application to set aside the registration of a foreign arbitration award. The respondent brought an ex-parte application before the Deputy Registrar for the registration of a foreign arbitration award made in the United Kingdom against the appellant. The Deputy Registrar granted the application and signed an order accordingly. The appellant duly filed an application to set aside the registration. The learned Judge opined that the contentions made by the appellant and the issues raised were prematurely brought up and could properly be canvassed at the time when the respondent would be seeking to actually enforce the award. The learned Judge, declined to set aside the registration.
Award failed and the registration of the award cannot be faulted. The arbitrators came to the conclusion that they had jurisdiction to determine the dispute, and proceeded to determine the dispute accordingly. The conclusion reached by the arbitrators that the parties reached an agreement in this matter is inescapable. It’s not true the arbitrators’ finding that the parties reached an agreement can be assailed. The contract document expressly provided for the settlement of any disputes arising out of the agreement by arbitration. Plus the arbitrators were appointed on the basis of the contract.
This is an application by the judgment debtor (David Whitehead) & to set aside registration of an arbitration award which was registered under an order ex parte saying within the stipulated time, the judgment debtor could apply for setting aside the registration. The order also indicated that the judgment creditor, Bauman, Hinde & Co. Ltd., should not issue execution until the application to set aside the registration is disposed of.
When there is no agreement to submit to arbitration, arbitrators have no authority to hold the arbitration. Their award cannot therefore be enforced. The Liverpool Association, it is said, had no jurisdiction to arbitrate since there was no agreement for arbitration. The contract had only been signed by the judgment creditor after the judgment creditor had executed it. The judgment debtor, who received the copy executed by the judgment creditor, has not executed it. It was not signed by the judgment debtor. The contract is, therefore, it is urged, not valid by the law in which it was made. The reasonable thing to do in this matter is to retain the registration of the award. It is further ordered that execution on the award be stayed till the application to enforce the award is determined. This will enable the judgment creditor to apply by action for enforcement of the award to which application the judgment debtor can raise the defenses that he is raising to the registration.