Claimant entered into a supply agreement with the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs of Nigeria for a combined expatriate residence permit and aliens card scheme, pursuant to which CTTL was to produce and supply electronic residence cards for the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs for use by the Nigeria Immigration Service. The agreement was subject to arbitration in Nigeria governed by Nigerian law. A dispute arose and arbitration proceedings commenced. The sums due from the first to third defendants under the award amounting to NGN29,660,166,207.48 plus interest and costs remain unpaid (about £140 million). The New York Convention applied to the award as Nigeria is a party to the Convention. An interim order granting permission to enforce the award in the UK and enter judgment was made. The defendants challenged the validity of the award in Nigeria and sought to stay the proceedings or set aside the judgment.
The sum of £100 million was to be provided by the defendants by way of security within 28 days.
LD applied for a final anti-suit injunction seeking to restrain the respondent ship owners from joining LD as a party to proceedings before the Mexico City Federal District. The Mexican Proceedings concerned cargo shipped by LD on the respondent's vessel, which was subsequently sold to "S". S alleged that the cargo was damaged on arrival. It was the respondent's case that the cargo had been damaged when the cargo was in storage with LD (before loading). The owner sought to join LD to the Mexican Proceedings as a third party. The parties did not agree as to the joinder. The court had to decide whether the respondent's conduct amounted to a breach of the arbitration clause in the bill of lading.
LD claimed for damages assessed at US$815,573.36 as a result of the cargo being unfit for human consumption
The parties entered into a contract for the sale by Razcom to BCS of 500 metric tons of cocoa beans. Razcom purchased the goods with finance provided by Ecobank Côte d’Ivoire. Razcom’s payment instructions contained in its invoice sought payment into Razcom’s account with Ecobank. Razcom was in dispute with Ecobank as shipping documents were delivered without payment. Instead, Razcom instructed BCS to make payment to its solicitor’s account. Nevertheless, BCS made payment to the bank, which was an unauthorised agent. The matter was referred to arbitration by the FCC. An award was published and action to enforce the award was taken. BCS argued that the order was defective and should be set aside. The High Court (Queen’s Bench Division) held that in all the circumstances there had been no substance to the defendant's submissions and there was no reason to set aside an order granting the claimant permission to enforce an arbitration award.
Application to set aside the order was rejected. Permission to appeal was not granted as there was no real prospect of the Court of Appeal taking a different view of the facts. A sum of £12,500 was to be paid summarily within 14 days.
The Respondent brought a cargo claim against the Appellant under section 2(1) Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 (“COGSA”). The Appellant requested a declaration of non liability from the tribunal, on the basis that the Respondent had no title to sue, as it had no title to the cargo. The case came before the High Court by way of an appeal under section 69 Arbitration Act 1996. The central dispute before the court was whether COGSA gives rise to different causes of action according to whether or not the holder of the bill of lading has suffered loss, and whether in this case it was necessary for the Respondent to plead a separate cause of action in relation to section 2(4) COGSA (i.e. one which arises specifically for parties with an interest in the goods who were not holders of the bill of lading). Burton J dismissed the appeal, holding that on a proper construction of section 2(4), the defendant was pursuing its own cause of action. In the event that it lost on the issue of original ownership of the goods (which it did in this case), it was entitled, albeit having suffered no loss, to recover, pursuant to its own cause of action, the loss suffered by the owner of the cargo and, in due course, to account for it. The judge also noted that a case brought under section 2(4) of COGSA had to be properly particularised in order for the opposing party to be able to raise the relevant defences.
Novasen (based in Senegal) entered into a contract for the sale of a cargo of oils with Sogescol. Sogescol entered into an agreement with Alimenta to purchase the oil, on the condition that its identity was not disclosed to Novasen. Novasen failed to deliver the oil. Alimenta claimed to be the undisclosed principal of Sogescol and thus entitled to enforce the contract. The arbitrators in the proceedings found that there was a contractual relationship between Alimenta and Novasen. An arbitration award was rendered and Novasen appealed under Section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996, on the grounds that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award for a number of reasons. HHJ Mackie QC dismissed the Appeal and held that there was an arbitration agreement in existence between Alimenta, as the undisclosed principal, and Novasen even though Sogescol was said to have acted outside of the scope of its authority when agreeing a change in the contract price. Therefore whether Sogescol had acted within the scope of its authority was a question for the arbitrators.
The Court was asked to consider issues arising from an Award of the London arbitration Tribunal in favour of Milan Nigeria Ltd for damage to cargo carried on the Angeliki B. The English law bills of lading were subject to the Hague Rules. Milan said the ship-owner carriers had breached Article III rule 2 of the Rules. The shipowners sought to avoid liability under Article IV rule 2(m). The Tribunal granted Milan US$150,000 – just 38% of their claim. Milan appealed to the Court. The High Court considered the following: 1. Burden of proving the cause of the cargo damage. The Court agreed that there was an error of law and damages should not have been reduced by 62%. 2. Was the Tribunal wrong to decide that Milan had the right to sue under the bills of lading? The Court refused the shipowners' application under section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court ruled that Milan’s claim was based on endorsement and delivery of the bills under COGSA. 3. Should damages have been awarded in Nigerian naira rather than U.S. dollars? Court refused to hear this issue, stating that the Tribunal had already decided.
Application for leave to appeal under s. 69 of the Act was rejected.
Claimants entered into an electricity supply agreement with Tanzania Electric Supply Co. Ltd (“TANESCO”), which provided for arbitration in Tanzania under Tanzanian law in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. TANESCO purported to terminate the Agreement on the basis that it was void ab initio for contravening the Tanzanian Public Procurement Act 2004. Dowans commenced arbitral proceedings in Tanzania. The arbitral tribunal found that the Agreement was valid and rendered an award against TANESCO. TANESCO applied to have the award set aside in the Tanzanian courts. Meanwhile, Dowans obtained enforcement of the award in the English High Court pursuant to section 101(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. TANESCO then applied to the Court to have the enforcement order set aside pursuant to section 103(2)(f) of the Act. The High Court considered that the fact that there was a challenge to the award pending before the Tanzanian courts did not mean that the award was “not yet binding” within the meaning of that section. The Court then observed that even if the award has been set aside in the home jurisdiction, there was still discretion to set aside, enforce or adjourn the award both pursuant to section 103(2)(f) and Article V(1)(e) NYC. In the Court’s view, its discretion under section 103(2)(f) would inevitably be exercised in the same manner as the discretion to adjourn under section 103(5).
The High Court held that a declaratory award on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is enforceable (under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996), allowing judgment to be entered in the same terms as the arbitral award. A dispute arose between the ship-owner, BD Shipsnavo and African Fertilizers, under a bill of lading. The bill of lading incorporated the terms and conditions of an underlying charter-party, which included a clause referring disputes to arbitration in London. African Fertilizers commenced both arbitration and court proceedings in Romania. The High Court granted an injunction restraining them from continuing the Romanian arbitration, and arbitration was commenced in London in accordance with the arbitration clause. The High Court also granted an interim declaration that the arbitration clause in the charter-party was validly incorporated into the bill of lading and that the Romanian court proceedings and arbitration proceedings were in breach of the agreement to arbitrate. Subsequently, the London arbitral tribunal granted a declaratory award in favour of BD Shipsnavo, holding that it had jurisdiction over its claim for a declaration of entitlement to a contribution. BD Shipsnavo obtained an order granting it leave, under section 66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, to enforce the award and to enter judgment against African Fertilizers. African Fertilizers then brought proceedings before the High Court to set aside that order.
Abuja was a hotel owner. It challenged an International Chamber of Commerce arbitral award that had been made in London in favour of the defendant, Meridien. The tribunal had upheld Meridien's claims that Abuja was in breach of a Nigerian law hotel management agreement in respect of the Nicon Luxury Hotel. From about 2007, Abuja unilaterally assumed management of the hotel. The tribunal ordered Abuja to pay Meridien around $7.2 million, plus interest and costs. Abuja then challenged the substantive jurisdiction of the tribunal under Section 67, on the grounds that the arbitration agreement was: • unconstitutional, illegal and invalid under Nigerian law; • contrary to public interest, having been agreed with constraint; and • invalid on the basis of force majeure and privatisation. The court rejected the challenge. It found that Nigerian law was irrelevant to the issues to be decided under Section 67. Although the hotel management agreement provided that the governing law was Nigerian law, the arbitration clause stated that the seat of the arbitration was London. The court relied on previous decisions to confirm that the law governing the arbitration agreement follows the law of the seat, and thus it was English law in this case. The parties had confirmed that understanding in the terms of reference. There were no grounds under English law to suggest that the arbitration agreement was invalid or unenforceable, and Abuja did not contend otherwise. Abuja's argument that the arbitration agreement was contrary to Nigerian public policy was irrelevant, as was its claim thatforce majeure in respect of the hotel management agreement would impair the validity of the arbitration agreement. The court also rejected Abuja's challenge that the tribunal's conduct amounted to serious irregularity under Section 68. Abuja submitted that the tribunal's decision was contrary to the evidence and that no reasonable tribunal could have reached it. However, Abuja did not demonstrate that the tribunal had exceeded its powers - many of Abuja's arguments were simply criticisms of the tribunal's decisions. Accordingly, Abuja's various arguments that the basis for the tribunal's calculation of damages, including damages for future losses, amounted to an excess of power or irregularity were irrelevant. Having set out the necessary legal criteria, the judge concluded that Abuja had failed to establish "any irregularity" within Section 68, still less a "serious" irregularity which had caused or would cause "substantial injustice".
Sucafina, a Swiss company specialising in coffee trading, entered into a number of contracts with the respondent; Mr Rotenberg. Each contract was subject to the European Contract for Coffee 1996 Edition and provided for the parties to choose where the arbitration is to be held. The principal issue between Sucafina and Mr Rotenberg was whether the contracts had been made with Mr Rotenberg in his personal capacity or as company director and shareholder (Congolese company). An award was rendered and Mr Rotenberg was held liable to pay $880,456.85 with interest, costs and arbitral fees. Mr Rotenberg appealed to the Board of Appeal, which published two awards which it described as “appeal interim award”: the first addressing the identity of the sellers under the contracts and the second dealing with quantum. The third award, which it described as the “final award” dealt with costs. Mr Rotenberg then issued proceedings under section 79 of the Arbitration Act 1996 seeking an extension of time for taking up the final award and a declaration that in the event that the final appeal award was not taken up, the interim awards should remain final and binding between the parties. The Commercial Court held in favour of Mr Rotenberg that the first and second interim awards of the Appeal Board were binding on the parties.
Application allowed as to costs. Sucafina was entitled to enforce that part of the Umpire’s award relating to costs and fees.
The dispute concerned a joint venture for the development of slum areas in Mumbai. An investment company, Kerrush Investments Ltd was set up with Arsanovia Limited, one of the claimants, and Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings, the defendant, as shareholders. (Unitech Limited was the parent company of the other two claimants, Arsanovia and Burley Holdings Ltd.) The parties entered into a shareholders agreement between Arsanovia, Cruz City and Kerrush and a Keepwell Agreement between Unitech Limited, Burley Holdings Ltd and Cruz City. Three separate arbitrations were commenced under the Agreements, which had an identical arbitration and governing law clause. The governing law of the Agreements was Indian law and the clauses provided for the seat to be London. The claimants sought to challenge two of the three awards under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 on the ground that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction. Smith J applied the SulAmérica test and concluded that the parties had impliedly chosen Indian law as the governing law for three reasons: 1) The governing law of the agreements was Indian law. Smith J referred to SulAmérica: "in the absence of any indication to the contrary, an express choice of law governing the substantive contract is a strong indication of the parties' intention in relation to the agreement to arbitration" (paragraph 26 of the SulAmérica decision).: 2) There was no contrary indication that Indian law was not the implied choice except for the choice of a London seat. : 3) The parties had specifically excluded the Indian Arbitration Act in the clauses, which meant that they anticipated that Indian law would otherwise have applied.
The application to challenge Award 1 only was granted as the Tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction and that the Award was of no effect on the merits.
U&M Mining Zambia Ltd, a Zambian subsidiary of a Brazilian company, operated a mine for Konkola Copper Mines plc, the owner of the mine and a Zambian subsidiary of UK-listed Vedanta Resources plc. The parties entered into an agreement, which was governed by Zambian law, and provided for disputes to be resolved by LCIA arbitration with the "place" of arbitration in London. The Agreement also provided for the Zambian courts to have exclusive jurisdiction. The respondents terminated the agreement and obtained an ex parte interim order from the High Court of Zambia requiring U&M to vacate the mine immediately and hand over certain equipment. U&M commenced LCIA arbitration in London and subsequently made a without notice application to the English High Court and obtained an anti-suit injunction restraining Konkola from taking any further steps in the Zambian courts. The courts identified the issues and held: 1) Seat: the “place” of arbitration was the seat of arbitration. 2) Whether the English courts had exclusive jurisdiction to grant interim remedies. It was common ground that, if the English courts did not have exclusive jurisdiction, then the anti-suit injunction must be set aside. Blair J referred to Dicey, Morris & Collins' The Conflict of Laws (15th ed) paragraph 16-036, that "the courts of the seat will have the sole supervisory and primary supportive functions in relation to the conduct of the arbitration" (emphasis added).
ECPA made an investment in a Mauritian company, owned by the owners of the Applicant companies. The parties entered into two relevant agreements: a Put Option Agreement and a Share Pledge Agreement. A dispute arose in relation to the Put Option Agreement and ECPA claimed for US$22,446,525 in LCIA arbitration proceedings seated in London. ECPA then sought to exercise its rights to the shares under the Share Pledge Agreement on the basis that there was a valid and unpaid debt under the Put Option Agreement. The Applicants sought to restrain such an exercise by applying on a number of occasions to both the arbitral tribunal and the Mauritian court, but did not obtain any relief. The Tribunal ruled, in particular, “the interim measures requested cannot be granted, as to do otherwise would prima facie be to modify the terms of what was previously agreed between the Parties.” The Applicants then applied to the English High Court for an interim injunction, seeking to restrain ECPA’s exercise of any rights under or derived from the Share Pledge Agreement, pending the final determination of the arbitration proceedings. The application was made under both Section 44 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 and Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981.
The claimant, which produced coke was an Egyptian company, owned by the State. The defendant was an Indian company involved in trading coal, coke and iron ore. The parties entered into a contract for the sale of low ash metallurgical coke. Disputes arose as to whether the claimant had repudiated the contract and the matter was referred to arbitration. Damages were awarded to the defendant. The claimant appealed. An issue arose as to the proper construction of a clause in an amendment to the sale contract, which provided that the agreement will be 'null and void' when it is not performed or 'executed'.
The claimant was an insurance company carrying on business in Kenya. The defendants were contractors in a project for the construction of a power plant in Kenya. The insurance policy that was signed by the parties contained a term which stated that Kenyan law and jurisdiction was applicable. The policy also included a reinsurance contract with third party reinsurers, which required that disputes were to be settled by arbitration in London in accordance with English law. The policy was subsequently amended by endorsement. The issues for the Court were (a) whether to declare that there was or was not a binding agreement to arbitrate; (b) whether to grant or refuse an injunction (interim or final) restraining proceedings other than by way of arbitration in London; and (c) whether to grant relief pursuant to s. 18 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (appointment of an arbitrator). The High Court held that a binding agreement to arbitrate existed and the claimant was entitled to refer the dispute to arbitration in London, and accordingly was also entitled to relief by way of injunction. The Court granted the contractors seven days to appoint an arbitrator. In his judgment, Mr Justice Walker concluded that the reasonable person must have understood the amended governing law provision to apply to both the reinsurance contract and the original contract. A reasonable observer would conclude that the jurisdiction provision should not prevent the amended arbitration provision from being effective in either the insurance or the reinsurance contract. Further, as the arbitration provision identified London as the seat of arbitration, it carried with it jurisdiction for the English court to supervise the arbitration.
BAIC was entitled to the relief identified in the consent order. Court held that an undertaking on the part of the contractors may be a preferred option to the grant of an injunction. Parties were asked to agree on consequential orders.
The case was about an application for the continuing of an anti suit injunction. The order was against the first defendant, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the second defendant, the Federal Inland Revenue Service. A dispute arose between the claimant and the first defendant and the matter was submitted to arbitration in London. Mr Justice Blair decided to continue the order as the position in Nigeria was deemed not to be clear. However, if the defendants make an application to vary or discharge the order, they ought to give notice to the claimant. Mr Justice Blair amended the notice period from two to four working days.
Application for the continuing of an anti suit injunction was granted.
The parties entered into an agreement to drill wells in an area near Cameroon. A dispute arose as the defendant company was in breach of their contract as it was communicating with the Cameroon authorities. The claimant company applied for an order to prevent the defendant from liaising with the authorities.
The defendant terminated an agency agreement with the claimant, and commenced a LCIA arbitration against it after the claimant alleged that it would bribe Nigerian officials. The arbitrator granted an interim award against the claimant, who challenged the award under section 67 and section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In relation to the application under section 67, the court stated that the relief sought by the defendant arose out of the agreement. It would seriously curtail the ambit of arbitration clauses if (unless the parties intended) an allegation of criminal conduct is sufficient to deprive an arbitrator of jurisdiction. In relation to the claimant's section 68 argument, the court stated that a decision by the arbitrator to proceed with a conference call in order to decide the date of the preliminary hearing in the absence of the claimant was not an irregularity, as the claimant did not give any real reasons why it could not appoint a representative to take part in the telephone conference.
Applications to challenge the awards were rejected.
Following a lengthy dispute regarding the construction of an export terminal in Nigeria, the claimant company (IPCO) applied to enforce an arbitration award made against the defendant company (NNPC). The High Court held that, on the evidence, IPCO had failed to establish a change of circumstances justifying a further application to enforce the award.
Application to enforce the award failed. Enforceability of the award should be decided in Nigeria.
The Charterers and Disponent Owners entered into an agreement under which the charterers were permitted to order the vessel through the Gulf of Aden without obtaining the prior consent of Disponent Owners. Subsequently, the Disponent Owners informed the charterers that they required the consent of head owners for any transit under the terms and conditions. They also added that the head owners usually deny permission. Popplewell J identified the following two issues: 1. Did Owners by their words or conduct evince an intention not to perform, or expressly declare that they would be unable to perform, their obligation under the Charter? 2. If so, did such refusal have the effect of substantially depriving Charterers of the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties that they should have obtained from the Charter? Charterers argued that the majority of the Tribunal made an error of law by applying an objective test in deciding whether the Owners had no intention of being bound by the Charterers. They argued that whether or not Head Owners would in fact grant permission was a speculative exercise. Mr Justice Popplewell disagreed and stated that “this was an attempt to appeal a finding of fact by dressing it up as an issue of law”. The uncertainty resulting from a party who has made his performance dependent on a discretion to be exercised by a third party does not put that party in anticipatory breach. On the second issue, the High Court held that the alleged anticipatory breach (failure to comply promptly with a legitimate voyage) was not a breach that would go to the root of the time charter. The Judge held that it was necessary to look at the question prospectively at the date of the anticipatory breach, and then ask whether the party’s conduct deprived the other party of the whole of that benefit. The Judge accepted Disponent Owners’ arguments that the benefit that the Charterers lost was the opportunity to market the vessel at “GOA OK” in the longer term. The Charterers were therefore not deprived of substantially the whole benefit of the charterparty.
Sonatrach was an Algerian state oil company and Statoil was a subsidiary of the Norwegian oil company Statoil ASA. The parties entered into various agreements, which included the obligations of Sonatrach, which subsequently failed to carry them out. Statoil issued a Request for Arbitration. Sonatrach disputed Statoil’s claim on the ground that the agreements were not valid, as the agreements were not approved by the Algerian Government. Sonatrach’s application to set aside the arbitration award was based on section 68(2)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996. It also alleged that there was improper use by the Tribunal of an administrative secretary. Cooke J awarded interest at 8% under the Judgments Act 1838 on the outstanding damages and costs awarded by the Tribunal from the date of the Order until payment. Sonatrach challenged this Order on the grounds that the Tribunal had not awarded post-award interest under section 49(4) of the Act and that awarding interest was contrary to this section. Flaux J dismissed the first ground holding that “it was entirely a matter for the tribunal what weight it gave to [the letter]” and that it was “far more likely that the tribunal did not refer specifically to the letter because it did not consider the letter of any weight than that the tribunal overlooked it.” Flaux J also concluded that there was “no question of the tribunal having mischaracterised the evidence“. Flaux J dismissed the second ground unequivocally on the basis that it was “a very serious allegation which [was] completely without merit and which should never have been made“.
The Tribunal had decided in favour of the Marshall Island owners of a vessel registered in Panama and managed by a Liberian company registered in Greece. The vessel was time chartered to German charterers on the basis of a charter made in Antwerp, which incorporated an additional typed clause providing for English law and arbitration. It awarded interest under the Late Payment of Commercial Debt (Interest) Act 1998 and held that the Act 1998 does not apply to charterparties based on the fact that the dispute resolution clause refers to English law and London arbitration. The Court also held that there was an error of law and that what was meant by "significant connection" in Section 12(1)(a) of the Act, is a connection between the substantive transaction itself and England: the factors relied upon "must provide a real connection between the contract and the effect of prompt payment of debts on the economic life of the United Kingdom".
A dispute arose between the claimant and the defendants. A substantial sum of money was owed to the claimant but the new Government refused to pay. The contract was terminated and the Governor confirmed that the State Government would not pay anybody as no work had been carried out. A request was made to the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and an arbitrator was appointed but due to an allegation of bias, the arbitrator resigned. A new request was then submitted to the Institute. The court then granted an order for service outside jurisdiction. Issues were raised as to the date of service of the claim form and the defendant failed to acknowledge service. The claimant subsequently made an application to change its name from “Ned Nwoko” to “Ned Nwoko Solicitors” on the claim form but subject to CPR 17.4(3), the question of mistake arises. An application to strike the claim or to extend the time for filing the acknowledgment of service was made by the First defendants while the claimant applied for an extension of time to serve the claim form. The following issues were considered: 1) Should the court exercise its discretion to grant the Claimant an extension of time to serve its claim form out of time? 2) Should the court exercise its discretion to grant the defendant leave to serve the acknowledgement of service out of time? 3) Can the claimant change the name on the claim form from his personal name to the name of a firm in respect of which he is not a partner? The court refused to extend the time limit to serve the claim form as the application was made to dispute jurisdiction, which has been accepted by the defendant. (see CPR 11). Although the arbitration clause referred to disputes being resolved either in UK or Nigeria, the court held that it was a valid arbitration clause. An application to appoint an arbitrator was made on behalf of Ned Nwoko Solicitors, while the name used on the claim form was Ned Nwoko. The court held that the fact that the names were used interchangeably was a genuine mistake.
The applicant applied for the continuation of an injunction, preventing the respondent from seeking injunctive relief in Mauritius. The respondent was a local agent in Mauritius for Evergreen, which subsequently purported to terminate the agency agreement. The agreement contained a clause specifying London as the seat of arbitration for disputes arising from the agreement and that the arbitration would be in accordance with the Arbitration Act 1996. The respondent applied for interim relief in Mauritius and the applicant obtained an injunction in England, preventing the respondent from pursuing with its claim through any means other than the arbitration proceedings, which had been commenced in London. The issues were whether . (i) the injunction should continue; and whether there should be a mandatory order requiring D to take all necessary steps to obtain a stay in Mauritius.
Application for the continuation of an injunction was granted. A mandatory order was also issued.
The applicant, an Indian company and the first respondent, a Nigerian company entered into two different contracts in relation to works to be carried out at a fertilizer plant in Nigeria. English law applied to the contracts and any disputes were to be referred to arbitration in London under LCIA Rules. Dangote made advance payments of approximately US$ 19 million and IOT procured guarantees, which were issued by the second respondent bank. The parties terminated the contract, alleging repudiation. IOT sought for a restraining order to prevent Dangote from making a demand under the advance payment guarantees and to require the second respondent bank to pay the sums demanded into a London bank account to the order of the court (the 'freezing order relief'). The court refused to continue (except on an interim basis pending the appeal) the freezing order (i) freezing the assets representing rights under the advance payment guarantees and (ii) directing that any payments made pursuant to demands on the APGs be to the client account of IOT's solicitors. Lord Justice Tomlinson did not consider that a party who contracts with a Nigerian company can legitimately 'pray in aid' as justifying freezing order relief the difficulties routinely encountered by those who seek to enforce judgments or awards in that jurisdiction.
A dispute arose under a charterparty between the Owners (Lorand Shipping) and the Charterers (Davof Trading (Africa) B.V.). Lorand Shipping referred a claim for demurrage to arbitration and asked the tribunal to reserve its jurisdiction in relation to other claims. The Charterers asked the tribunal to dismiss all such claims. The tribunal issued a final award where it refused to reserve its jurisdiction and held that any other claims would be brought in a new arbitration. The owners challenged the final award, arguing that the tribunal had failed to comply with its general duty under section 33 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court held that the parties were not given adequate opportunity to present their case, which constituted a serious irregularity, which led to substantial injustice for the purposes of section 68 of the Act. The Court held that, as a matter of arbitral process, where a claim is submitted to a tribunal for determination, the tribunal is obliged to determine it one way or the other and has no power to decline to act.
Court granted an order setting aside part of a final award and remitted the matter to the tribunal
In earlier arbitration proceedings, Cruz obtained an award against the defendants for about US $300 million. The first defendant was an Indian company and the second defendant was a subsidiary of Unitech and was based in Mauritius. Cruz sought enforcement of the award including enforcement in India, obtaining a final charging order in the Isle of Man over Unitech's shareholding in Unitech Overseas Limited (UOL), starting enforcement proceedings in Cyprus and obtaining a worldwide freezing order in Mauritius. The claimants sought the appointment of receivers by way of equitable execution over certain assets of the first and second defendants. Section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 gives the court jurisdiction to appoint a receiver in all cases where it is 'just and convenient to do so'. The court found that receivers should be appointed, as it was just and convenient to do so on the following reasons: • It was difficult to identify Unitech's assets; • Recovery by other processes of execution in the countries where the defendants had assets was not practicable as the defendants had made clear they would do everything they could to prevent or delay enforcement; • The appointment of receivers would an effective remedy; • The defendants were aware of the consequences of not complying with the receivership order; • With the appointment of a receiver any breach of the freezing order would be apparent.
The claimants comprised a seafood supply company incorporated in Sierra Leone and its majority shareholders. In 2011, the Claimants entered into an agreement with the first and second respondents. The first respondent, Mr Farran, was the Chairman of Finance Bank SAL, a Lebanese bank. In 2012, the Claimants entered into a further loan agreement with Mr Farran and Mr Assad which provided for arbitration in Sierra Leone or London. When no repayments were made Mr Farran and Mr Assad commenced arbitration and proposed the appointment of the third respondent, Mr Ali Zbeeb, as arbitrator. The Claimants objected to the appointment of Mr Zheeb but he did not resign. Concerns about his independence were subsequently raised as Mr Zheeb’s father had been a legal advisor to Mr Farran and the Bank for many years and that Mr Zbeeb had also acted as Legal Counsel to the Bank. Mr Zbeeb dismissed the Claimants’ concerns. The Claimants then issued an application to remove Mr Zbeeb as arbitrator under section 24(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act 1996. The court held that Mr Zbeeb’s law firm, having acted for Mr Farran, and for the Bank, fell within one of only four situations identified in the “Non-Waivable Red List” in the IBA Conflict of Interest Guidelines that give rise to justifiable doubts about the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality and in which an arbitrator should refuse appointment. In addition, section 73 of the Act provides that if a party to arbitral proceedings takes part without promptly making any objection he may not raise that objection later unless he shows that, at the time, he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds for objection.The court found that each of the three aspects of the evidence above was sufficient on its own to give rise to justifiable doubts about Mr Zbeeb’s impartiality.
The Claimant entered into a contract with the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, represented by the Civil Aviation Authority for the design, construction and first 41 years’ operation of a new airport on the Red Sea Coast in Egypt. There were doubts about the authenticity of the documents submitted by the Claimant and the Egyptian Holding Company for Aviation gave notice to Malicorp that it was cancelling the Contract. Arbitration proceedings were commenced in Cairo. The Tribunal constituted of three arbitrators but the award was signed by two of them only. The Cairo Award (i) found that the Tribunal only had jurisdiction in respect of the Government, but not the second and third Respondents (Egyptian Holding Company for Aviation and Egyptian Airports Company), because it was the only respondent that was a party to the Contract, and (ii) ordered that the Government pay Malicorp US$14,773,497 in damages pursuant to Article 142 of the Egyptian Civil Code.In 2012, the Cairo Court of Appeal rendered a decision setting aside the award. That decision is currently under appeal to the Egyptian Court of Cassation. Prior to the Cairo Award being set aside, Malicorp sought to enforce the Cairo Award in France. This application was refused by both the Paris Court of Appeal and the Paris Cour de Cassation. That same year, Malicorp also brought a claim against the Government for expropriation, which was ultimately rejected by an ICSID tribunal in 2011.Malicorp also made an application for permission to enforce the Cairo Award in England & Wales pursuant to section 101(2) of the Arbitration Act. Flaux J considered the application on the papers and then granted permission, reserving Egypt’s right to apply to set aside the order for enforcement. The application considered by Walker J in the present judgment was made by Egypt who sought to set aside the permission to enforce the Cairo Award. Given that the Cairo Award is a New York Convention award, Walker J could only refuse enforcement if the case fell within the exceptions enshrined in sections 103(2) to 103(4) of the 1996 Act. The first ground that was considered was whether the Cairo Award had been set aside by the 2012 Cairo Decision. Walker J referred to section 103(2) of the Act and cited Dicey, Morris & Collins and Simon J in Yukos Capital S.a.r.L v OJS Oil Company Rosneft [2014] EWHC 2188 (Comm) and concluded that unless and until the Cairo Decision was overturned by the Egyptian Court of Cassation, there was no good reason to depart from the usual approach ; which is that the Cairo Decision should be treated as final. The second ground considered was whether the Cairo Award granted remedies on a basis that was neither pleaded nor argued. There was no doubt in Walker J’s estimation that the award of damages under Article 142 “must have been a complete surprise to Egypt“, constituting a serious breach of natural justice. Walker J also declined to exercise his discretion to enforce the Cairo Award notwithstanding such breach because the breach was “too serious, and the consequences for Egypt [were] too grave.”
Walker J granted Egypt’s application to set aside the order enforcing the Cairo Award.
UM entered into an agreement with the Government of the Union of Comoros in 2007, under which UM was authorised to act on the Government’s behalf in relation to the maritime administration of Comoros, including the registration of vessels under the Comoros flag. A dispute arose as to the termination of the agreement by the Government and the matter was referred to a sole arbitrator. An award was issued rejecting the claims of UM and the Government’s counterclaim. The Government subsequently requested for the award to be corrected or clarified under section 57(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996. An amended award was then rendered, resolving two matters in favour of the Government. UM then applied to set aside the amended award on the basis that the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction under section 68 of the Act.
The English Commercial Court rejected application for an order setting aside
Mr Tanoh was an employee at Ecobank and the terms of his employment contract specified that disputes should be referred to arbitration in London under the UNCITRAL rules. A dispute arose in relation to termination of the contract and Mr Tanoh commenced litigation in the Republic of Cote D'Ivoire and also in the Togolese Republic. Ecobank contested jurisdiction but was unsuccessful. It then commenced its own arbitration proceedings but did not seek an anti-suit injunction from the English courts. Mr Tanoh was successful in both sets of proceedings and was awarded approximately US$24 million. When Mr Tanoh sought to enforce the foreign judgments, Ecobank applied to the English court for an anti-enforcement injunction. The court rejected Ecobank's application on the grounds that there had been a delay in seeking the injunction.
The English High Court confirmed that it has the power to grant anti-enforcement injunctions, but refused the claimant's application due to unnecessary delay.
The claimant was a Nigerian subsidiary of Z, an oil and gas company. D1 and D3 were affiliated companies, based in Nigeria, which were engaged in the production of crude oil. D2 was the parent company of D1 and D3 and was incorporated in the Cayman Islands. C commenced LCIA arbitration proceedings against D1 and D2; seeking performance of their payment obligations under the Sale and Purchase agreement. The Claimant sought to challenge two out of the five findings of the Partial Award rendered in October 2014 under sections 67 and 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996. The claimant was challenging the fact that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear disputes in relation to the Production Sharing Contract and to join D3 to the arbitration without the consent of all existing parties. The court considered the four following issues: 1) Whether C has lost the right to challenge the Award; 2) Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear disputes in relation to the Production Sharing Contract; 3) Whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine claims made by D3 (rather than on his behalf); 4) Whether the Tribunal has the power to join D3 to the arbitral proceedings.
Application to challenge the partial award was dismissed.